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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) is envisioned as a trans-
formative approach with a wide range of applications in various
sectors such as home automation, industrial control, and agricul-
ture. It promises innovative business models and improved user
experience. However, as evidenced by recent attacks such as the
Mirai botnet, IoT networks and systems remain very vulnerable
and require stronger protection mechanisms. Furthermore, due
to processing, memory, and power constraints of typical IoT
devices, traditional Internet security mechanisms are not always
feasible or appropriate. In this work, we are concerned with
designing an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for protecting IoT
networks from external threats as well as internal compromised
devices. Our proposed design adopts a signature-based intrusion
detection approach and involves both certralised and distributed
IDS modules. Using the Cooja simulator, we have implemented
a Denial of Service (DoS) attack scenario on IoT devices. This
scenario exploits the RPL protocol, which is widely used for
routing in low-power networks, including IoT networks. In
particular, we have implemented two variants of DoS attacks,
namely “Hello” flooding and version number modification. As
shown by simulation results, these attacks may impact the
reachability of certain IoT devices and their power consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of smart devices led to an Internet-
connected world called “Internet of Things” (IoT) [1]. In the
literature, these devices are usually referred to as “things”,
IoT devices, smart devices, sensors, or motes. IoT devices are
typically resource-constrained (low processing power, small
batteries, limited memory), but can connect to the Internet, ex-
change data, and perform limited computations. Some known
IoT application domains are smart home, industrial control,
health monitoring, and smart grid [2, 3]. However, apart from
the obvious benefits, IoT brought new security and privacy
challenges.
According to a recent report by Gemalto [4], securing smart
devices is not a priority for manufacturers. This enables the
attackers to target IoT devices with weak security measures.
A recent example of a cyber attack is the Mirai botnet [5],
which exploited the default passwords in many IoT devices (IP
cameras, digital video recorders) and coordinated a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack to many targets. This and
other similar incidents indicate that the security of IoT devices
and networks must be re-examined and appropriate solutions
should be developed to protect businesses, consumers, and
critical infrastructure.
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a security technol-
ogy that monitors networks or systems for malicious activity
or policy violations. In the recent years, IDSes have attracted
the attention of security researchers and practitioners for
protecting IoT devices [6]. In the literature, three types of in-
trusion detection methods are typically distinguished, namely
signature-based, anomaly-based, and specification-based [7].
Hybrid approaches, that combine two or more methods, are
also gaining popularity.
Signature-based IDS may detect an attack/intrusion if the
attack’s signature is already stored in the internal database.
These systems can detect known attacks very accurately and
this is the reason why they are widely used in the industry.
Anomaly-based detection tries to recognise malicious be-
haviour. It needs the previous creation of profiles for defining
the normal behaviour of users, hosts, or networks. Therefore,
the required data is collected and stored in a database during
the normal operation. Specification-based detection is similar
to anomaly-based detection. In this method, the normal be-
haviour is defined by taking into account the functionalities
and the security policies of the system. A profile with the
expected normal behaviour is created and regularly consulted.
In this paper, we propose a new signature-based IDS for the
detection of DoS and routing attacks in IoT networks. This
IDS follows a hybrid placement strategy for IDS modules.
That is, it involves both centralised and distributed compo-
nents. In particular, the main router runs the detection module
and other lightweight modules are deployed in the network
in close proximity to the IoT devices for the purposes of
traffic monitoring and reporting. One of the advantages of
this approach is that no software modification of current
devices/sensors is required. Furthermore, all the IDS modules
are connected via wired communication channels in order to
avoid jamming or other types of wireless attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we present our considered 7-layer IoT reference model. In
Section III, we briefly discuss the attacks that may occur in IoT
environments. In Section IV, we present the most important
currently available IDS solutions. In section V, we describe
our DoS attack implementation in Cooja simulator and present
the simulation results. In Section VI, we describe our proposed
IDS design, including a high-level architecture and its main
components. We conclude and discuss our future work in
Section VII.
II. SEVEN-LAYER IOT REFERENCE MODEL
Among different proposed IoT reference models, CISCO’s
7-layer model [8] is the most detailed one and has been
adopted in this work. The layers of CISCO’s model are shown
in Fig. 1. In this work, we are mostly concerned with Layers
1-3.
Starting from Level 1, physical devices are the smart de-
vices, which send or receive generated/censored data. Level 2
refers to the connectivity between the devices, within the same
network or across different networks. IoT devices should be
able to reliably transmit data using existing networks. Level 3
activities include data analysis and transformation. In other
words, network packets are processed in that level to be
understandable to the higher levels. Level 4 is where data is
stored and can be used by applications when needed. These
data are abstracted in Level 5. This means that data gathered
from different sources can be combined and simplified for
use in applications. Level 6 is the “Application” level where
information is read from Level 5. Applications vary from
analytics to system management and control. The highest
level is the “Collaboration and Processes” level where the end
users are. Making the IoT system useful requires people to
collaborate and use IoT applications and their data.
III. ATTACKS IN IOT
Many IoT devices are still unsecured and attackers could
exploit the existing vulnerabilities to cause damage or steal
confidential information. In this section, we briefly review
the most important types of attacks against IoT devices. For
describing attacks, CISCO’s 7-layer IoT reference model is
assumed.
At the Physical Devices layer, malicious modification of
firmware in physical devices could allow the attacker to get
access to their data that are stored or in transit. Non-network
side-channel attack is another method to exploit the hardware
of IoT devices. In that attack, device’s electromagnetic signals
are monitored by an adversary in order, for example, to reveal
the status of the device. Another threat is DoS attacks such
as battery draining and resource exhaustion [9]. For example,
an adversary may deprive a device from going to sleep by
regularly sending “Hello” messages or may exhaust the limited
power/memory resources by submitting heavy computation
tasks. Last but not least, a node can be cloned by an attacker
so that its packets are modified and redirected.
At the Connectivity level, eavesdropping is an attack in
which the attacker sniffs network packets and tries to export
critical information such as usernames and passwords. Conse-
quently, the attacker can get access to devices, learn about the
network infrastructure, or steal crucial data. Routing, replay,
and Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks [10] are also dangerous
attacks in which the adversary tries to change routing infor-
mation, and modify, spoof, or drop packets. Furthermore, DoS
attacks at the Connectivity level can reduce the performance
of the whole IoT network. Specifically, signal jamming and
packet flooding are the most common DoS attacks that target
device’s communication channels. Finally, smart devices can
Fig. 1. CISCO’s IoT reference model
be turned into bots and used for DoS attacks against selected
targets, as was the case with the infamous Mirai botnet [5].
At the Edge Computing level, an attacker could inject
malicious input to the servers or the network to steal sensitive
data. In a similar way, leaking information from a device or
server could help the attacker extract information about the
types of components and services used in the IoT network.
For instance, database errors or warnings reveal important
information to the attackers.
All in all, many security issues exist in IoT networks today.
Taking into account the well-known Confidentiality, Integrity
& Availability (CIA) triad, one of the most important issues
to address is to ensure data availability. Data obtained from
sensors or other IoT devices should be available when needed.
Therefore, DoS and routing attacks should be prevented or
eliminated from creating problems to IoT devices and net-
works. Hence, ensuring data availability and protecting against
related attacks is the main focus of this work.
IV. CURRENT IDS SOLUTIONS FOR IOT
IDSes as security measures have been considered by re-
searchers for protecting networks with heterogeneous IoT
devices. However, IDSes in traditional networks have differ-
ent requirements than IoT-based IDSes. Therefore, adapting
traditional IDS approaches in IoT environments is not an easy
and straightforward task. Features such as limited computation
power of smart devices, different network structures, and
various developed protocols of IoT devices introduce new
challenges that should be addressed by an IoT-based IDS
[6]. Below we briefly describe the most important recent IDS
solutions for IoT.
Kalis [11] is one of the first developed IDSes that aims
at protecting IoT devices irrespective of the IoT proto-
col or application used. Kalis is a network-based, hybrid
signature/anomaly-based, hybrid centralized/distributed, on-
line IDS. The selected detection strategy depends on specific
network characteristics. Furthermore, Kalis obtains knowledge
from modules installed in the network, and attempts to prevent
DoS attacks based on the current network topology, traffic
analysis, and mobility information. Kalis can support new
protocol standards and allows knowledge sharing between the
nodes for better detection. It is implemented on smart routers
using the OpenWRT firmware [12]. Evaluation is done using
6 TelosB devices programmed in TinyOS [13]. Experimental
results show that Kalis has better detection performance than
traditional IDSes.
Another remarkable work in the field is the SVELTE IDS
[14]. This is a signature- and anomaly-based IDS, developed
to protect IoT devices from routing attacks based on the
IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks
(RPL) [15]. Some of the considered attacks include altering
information, sinkhole forwarding, and selective forwarding.
SVELTE follows a hybrid module placement approach in
which a centralised module, called 6LoWPAN Border Router
(6BR), performs heavy calculations and a number of resource-
constrained modules are responsible for the monitoring tasks.
The 6BR has three components. The first one is the 6LoWPAN
Mapper which recreates the network based on the information
obtained from IoT nodes. The second component is the IDS
one which analyzes information and detects intrusion. The
last one is a mini firewall which stops malicious traffic from
entering the network. The first and third components are
embedded into the IoT nodes.
Despite good progress in developing IoT-based IDSes, cur-
rent solutions have several limitations. Kalis, for example,
requires installation of specialised detection modules for de-
tecting each type of attack. This could create a complex net-
work and could lead in poor detection performance. Moreover,
it uses WiFi as communication technology. This means that
interference between the smart sensors and Kalis nodes is
possible if they are in close proximity. SVELTE has also some
limitations as it requires the modification of sensors’ software.
This, however, would be very inconvenient for networks with
large numbers of sensors, which is a typical case in many
IoT application domains. All in all, a new technologically
improved solution is needed to protect IoT networks from a
wide range of possible attacks. The aforementioned limitations
have been taken into account when designing our proposed
IDS solution.
V. IMPLEMENTING IOT ATTACKS IN COOJA
In order to design an effective IDS, the first step is to
implement a number of attacks and observe their impact
on the individual devices and on the network as a whole.
After that, by launching attacks with different configuration
parameters and intensities, various detection techniques can
be implemented, tested, and improved.
For testing and experimentations we use the Cooja simulator
[16], which is gaining popularity among IoT researchers.
Cooja is particularly suitable for real-world experiments, since
the developed applications can be uploaded directly to real
hardware. In particular, Cooja can be used to simulate the be-
haviour of Contiki OS [17] - a popular open source operating
system for IoT.
In this work, we have implemented in Cooja two IoT-
specific DoS attacks, namely “Hello” flooding and version
number modification. These attacks are based on the RPL
routing protocol and affect the availability of the network.
Cooja already provides an implementation of RPL, called Con-
tikiRPL. RPL organizes routers along a Destination Oriented
Fig. 2. The network used in Cooja simulations
Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) [18]. The graph root initi-
ates the graph formation by periodically originating DODAG
Information Object (DIO) messages which it advertises via
link-local multicast. DIO messages carry information such as
root’s identity, routing metrics in use, as well as the originating
router’s depth (called “rank”).
The “Hello” flooding attack in RPL may be launched when
a malicious RPL node creates massive amount of traffic by
sending DODAG Information Solicitation (DIS) messages to
other RPL nodes, causing the recipient nodes to respond by
sending DIO messages. As a result, congestion is created
in the network and nodes are energy exhausted. Similarly,
in version number modification attack the malicious node
increases the DODAG version number before forwarding the
received DIO messages to the next hop. This causes again
resource exhaustion.
Fig. 3. Scenario 1 (normal operation): Network topology
Fig. 4. Scenario 1 (normal operation): Power consumption measurements
Below we demonstrate two scenarios, simulated in Cooja,
showing the effects of the aforementioned DoS attacks. The
application used in IoT nodes/sensors is based on the UDP
client-server model. Seven Tmote Sky nodes [19] running
Contiki OS have been simulated. The network, depicted in
Fig. 2, consists of six client nodes with identities (IDs) from
2 to 7 and one server/root node with ID 1. In the first
scenario, we do not consider compromised nodes. Each node
regularly sends messages to the root node. These messages
contain various information about the sending node, such as
its temperature and battery indicator. In the second scenario,
node 7 is malicious/compromised and performs DoS attacks.
In particular, node 7 has been modified to send a large number
of DIS messages to its neighbours. Also, it increases the
DODAG version number so that the so-called global repairs
are initiated. This causes the IoT nodes to perform unnecessary
computations and consume energy. The simulation time in our
experiments in each scenario is 10 minutes.
In the first scenario, the network topology is formed as
shown in Fig. 3. The numbers shown on each link indicate
the Expected Transmission Count (ETX) value which is the
number of transmissions that a node expects to make to
a destination in order to successfully deliver a packet. For
example, node 4 which is next to the root (node 1) has the
ETX value of 8. In Fig. 3 we also observe that messages
from node 7 have to be delivered through nodes 3, 2 and
4 in order to reach the root node. Note that node 7 in this
Fig. 5. Scenario 2 (attack): Network topology
Fig. 6. Scenario 2 (attack): Power consumption measurements
scenario is not malicious and is running the same code as all
other nodes. Figure 4 shows the power consumption of each
node. Measurements were obtained using the PowerTracker
tool available in Cooja. As expected, all nodes are almost
always on (average 99.87% of the time) and have very low
Radio TX and Radio RX values. This is normal for networks
of small sizes.
In the second scenario, node 7 has been configured to
send 80 DIS messages as well as to increase the DODAG
version number before forwarding the received DIO messages
to the next hop towards the root node. The modification of the
version number results in the global repair and the creation of
two different DODAGs. Global repair is triggered every few
minutes. As a result, routes change rapidly. Hence, the network
topology is not fixed and some nodes may be disconnected
from the root or other nodes. One such situation is shown in
Fig. 5, where nodes 5 and 6 do not have a route to the root
in that particular moment. The impact of the attack is shown
in Fig. 6, which shows the power consumption measurements.
The attack has caused high Radio TX for node 7 and high
Radio RX in neighbouring nodes 3, 5, and 6. As a result, both
malicious/compromised and neighbouring nodes are energy
exhausted.
VI. PROPOSED SIGNATURE-BASED IDS
A. IDS Architecture and Components
In this section, our proposed IDS solution is described. The
IDS is signature-based, because such approaches are more
accurate in detecting known attacks, compared to anomaly-
based approaches, and typically no heavy computations are
required [7].
In addition to the typical sensor nodes, we consider two new
types of devices: i) IDS routers for running both the detection
module and a firewall, and ii) sensor-like devices, called IDS
detectors, for monitoring and sending suspicious traffic to the
router. In a typical scenario of a small IoT network, there
will be one IDS router and several IDS detectors. The IDS
router may also play the role of the Border Router (BR) of
the network, as shown in Fig. 7. This means that, sensors
requiring to communicate with a server, will send all the
requests through the IDS router. All passing traffic is checked
by the router who will take the decision whether the sending
node is malicious or not.
IDS detectors monitor sensors’ traffic to help in detecting
malicious nodes. Compromised devices may attempt to inter-
Fig. 7. High-level IDS architecture
rupt the network internally without having to communicate
with the BR or external networks. For such cases, IDS
detectors will log network traffic and if a node’s behaviour
resembles a known attack, the related information will be
forwarded to the BR for decision making.
In the example of Fig. 7, we have five Tmote Sky sensors
and the IDS consisting of one BR and two detectors. The BR
is connected to the Internet and includes two components: a
firewall and a detection module. These two components help
in protecting the network both internally and externally. The
detection module runs algorithms to help in decision making,
while the firewall creates and enforces rules for blocking
malicious sensor requests. The detectors are wired connected
to the BR to avoid jamming or eavesdropping via a wireless
channel. In cases where a wireless channel between the BR
and the detectors is unavoidable or preferable, appropriate
secure wireless communication scheme will be in place (e.g.,
[20]). Any traffic exchanged between the sensors is captured
by the nearest detector. Afterwards, a lightweight algorithm is
executed to decide if traffic should be forwarded to the BR
or not. We assume that detectors will be resource-constrained.
Hence, algorithms that require heavy computations or large
amounts of memory and storage, would not be suitable.
The combination of BR and detectors helps in capturing
traffic from both internal and external communications. For
example, some compromised devices may try to communicate
with a remote server in order to download commands. Other
compromised devices may exchange traffic locally. Our design
considers all types of communications so that malicious nodes
can be blocked. The BR captures traffic from both WiFi and
IEEE 802.15.4 channels. The BR is also able to detect attacks
from Zigbee/6LoWPAN devices. Similarly to other signature-
based solutions, the proposed IDS stores malicious patterns in
the detection module of the BR who is the bridge between the
internal network and the Internet. For this reason, it is assumed
to have enough computational power to run algorithms for
detecting different types of attacks.
B. Attack Mitigation
As mentioned earlier, the proposed IDS aims at detecting
and preventing a wide range of different types of attacks. For
example, DoS attacks that may occur inside IoT networks to
achieve resource exhaustion of the sensor nodes. In addition
to that, routing attacks are usually exploiting the RPL pro-
tocol which is currently used by smart sensors in many IoT
networks. Sinkhole attacks, selective forwarding, and clone ID
are some of the widely known routing attacks.
The above mentioned attacks can be mitigated by measuring
the Received Signal Strength (RSS), packet data drop rate, or
packet sending rate, and by monitoring the number of node IDs
in the network [21]. According to reports, these attacks are the
ones most commonly used and may affect the availability as
well as the integrity of IoT systems. Designing and developing
an efficient IDS to protect against DoS and routing attacks in
IoT networks is currently an open problem.
As far as the scalability of the proposed IDS is concerned,
even in large networks good efficiency is expected. To ensure
that, IDS detectors will forward to BR only the necessary
traffic. That is, detectors will perform certain calculations (e.g.,
RSS and packet drop rate) and only if the metric of interest is
above a threshold, node’s traffic will be forwarded to the BR
for further investigation (e.g., signature matching).
C. Detection Module and Firewall
As discussed before, a very important part of the proposed
IDS is the detection module within the BR. This module
is responsible for classifying a node as malicious or not.
The decision is based on the individual information collected
for each node. For instance, if a node sends to other nodes
too many packets with high rate or the node’s signal power
is above a threshold, then this node may be considered as
malicious. In that case, the node may be removed from the
network, its IP will be blacklisted, an appropriate firewall
rule will be created, and the network administrator will be
alerted. On the other hand, attacks such as selective forwarding
are difficult to detect and require more time to identify the
malicious node. Signatures of current IoT malware will be
stored in the detection module. If a packet matches a known
malicious signature or pattern, the destination and source node
will be immediate blacklisted.
The firewall inside the BR serves as an additional layer
of protection. The firewall will contain rules for blocking IP
addresses of nodes which are malicious. Nodes are blocked
only if the detection module has information of malicious
behaviour. In that case, a new rule with the node’s IP is created
and the node cannot send or receive data from the Internet.
As far as the placement strategy of IDS modules is con-
cerned, a hybrid approach has been adopted. The centralized
node (i.e, BR), stores signatures, analyzes traffic and detects
attacks originating from the sensors or coming from the
Internet. The decentralized nodes (i.e., IDS detectors), perform
lightweight tasks such as monitoring and reporting network
data to the BR. This placement strategy helps in capturing
traffic and detecting attacks from all network segments. Fur-
thermore, deploying detectors in close proximity to the sensors
aims at detecting attack attempts faster and more efficiently
rather than waiting the attack traffic to pass via the BR.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a signature-based IDS for IoT
networks. We presented a high-level IDS architecture and
its main components. The proposed approach involves both
centralised and distributed modules for detecting intrusions
originating from external networks as well as from internal
compromised nodes. The chosen platform for developing and
testing the IDS solution is the Cooja simulator, which supports
application development for Contiki OS. We have also demon-
strated an attack scenario in Cooja, where a compromised
node performs DoS attacks that rely on “Hello” flooding
and version number modification. As shown, the attack may
constitute some nodes unreachable and may negatively impact
their power consumption. In our future work we plan to
implement and test the proposed design in Cooja. We will
also evaluate and improve the IDS performance by reducing
the false positives during the attack detection process. Finally,
we will import the IDS modules to Contiki OS in order to test
its performance in a real-world IoT environment.
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